In this paper we discuss how to construct encryption schemes from permutations. Firstly we discuss an intuitive way to design permutation-based encryption schemes, that is by combining mainstream blockcipherbased encryption modes (such as CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR) with the Even-Mansour cipher, which is an elegant permutation-based blockcipher. Unfortunately, most of encryption schemes produced by the combination strategy are not secure enough. Then we propose 4 permutation-based encryption schemes -PCBC, POFB, PCFB and PCTR, which can resist both the blockwise adaptive attack and the Φ ⊕ -related-key attack when using a non-repeated nonce. To illustrate it, we give a definition of the indistinguishability from random bits against blockwise adaptive chosen plaintext attack in the Φ ⊕ -related-key setting, and then prove the security of PCBC in such definition. The other 3 schemes have similar results. Constructing from a single permutation, these 4 encryption schemes are practical, in the sense that they are less prone to misuse, bring less pressure on the keymanagement in real world, and apply to blockwise adaptive scenarios including real-time applications, on-line settings, memory-restricted devices, etc. Moreover they are more efficient than the Sponge construction.
INTRODUCTION
The winner of SHA-3 competition, a permutationbased hash function, inspires a great many studies on cryptographic permutations and permutation-based cryptographic schemes. Lots of cryptographic permutations were designed, including KECCAK (Dworkin, 2015) , Prφst (Kavun et al., 2014) , PRIMATEs (Andreeva et al., 2014) , Minalpher-P (Sasaki et al., 2014) -just to name a few. Numerous cryptographic schemes are designed to be based on cryptographic permutations, especially a large number of authenticated encryption schemes submitted to the CAE-SAR competition, including Ascon (Dobraunig et al., 2014) , PAEQ (Biryukov and Khovratovich, 2014) , KETJE (Bertoni et al., 2014) , APE (Sasaki et al., 2014) , OTR (Kavun et al., 2014) , and so on. More other permutation-based cryptographic schemes are studied, including lightweight hash functions like SPON-GENT (Bogdanov et al., 2011) and Quark (Aumasson et al., 2013) , streamciphers like Salsa (Bernstein, 2008) , tweakable blockciphers like XPX (Mennink, 2016) and TEM (Cogliati and Seurin, 2015) , blockciphers like Even-Mansour (Even and Mansour, 1997) , etc. However there are little solo studies on permutation-based encryption schemes, which motivates us to discuss how to construct encryption schemes from a single cryptographic permutation.
Background
Encryption scheme. Encryption schemes are designed to provide data confidentiality, and common encryption modes of operation are based on blockcipher, including CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), OFB (Output Feedback), CFB (Cipher Feedback) and CTR (Counter), etc. When using a random IV (Initialization Vector), these 4 modes are proved to be secure in the single-key chosen plaintext attack (CPA for short) setting (Bellare et al., 1997; Alkassar et al., 2001; Sung et al., 2001) .
Unfortunately, it is a great challenge to implement random IVs in real world, and once the IV is predictable, these encryption modes, excluding CTR, are no longer secure (Duong and Rizzo, 2011; Bard, 2004; Dai, 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; Rogaway, 1996) . In (Rogaway, 2004) , Rogaway discussed the case when the IV is guaranteed to be a nonce which takes fresh values in each encryption and even can be chosen by the adversary. Rogaway believed that nonce-based symmetric encryptions are less prone to misuse.
Blockwise adaptive attack. In some practical application environments like real-time applications, online settings, memory-restricted devices, etc., the data is processed and outputted block by block, rather than as an atomic object, arising the blockwise adaptive attack (Bellare et al., 2002; Fouque et al., 2003; Fouque et al., 2004; Joux et al., 2002; Bard, 2006; Bard, 2007) , which assumes that the adversary can adaptively choose subsequent input blocks based on the preceding output blocks. The blockwise adaptive attack is not only of theoretical interest, owing to its operational feasibility in the Secure Shell (SSH) (Bellare et al., 2002) and the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) (Bard, 2006) . Some encryption schemes that are secure against the traditional chosen plaintext attack turn out to suffer the blockwise adaptive attack, like CBC, while some still maintain the confidentiality against such stronger attack, like OFB, CFB and CTR using a random IV (Fouque et al., 2003; Fouque et al., 2004) .
Related-key attack. The related-key attack has studied extensively for various cryptographic applications (Biham, 1993; Karpman, 2015; Bellare and Kohno, 2003; Albrecht et al., 2011) , which assumes that the adversary has the capability to query not only the scheme with the secret key K but also ϕ(K) where ϕ is a key-deriving-function that can be chosen. Though this stronger attack is not far-fetched in practical scenarios, it is not covered by the classic security notions, and we have to take it into consideration when analyzing encryption schemes (no matter already designed or new).
Even-Mansour cipher.
The Even-Mansour cipher (Even and Mansour, 1997) , designed from a single permutation by eXclusive-ORing(XOR) two independent keys into its input and output respectively, attracts a great interest due to its elegant structure, and lots of related studies were published (Daemen, 1991; Chen and Steinberger, 2014; Dunkelman et al., 2012; Dobraunig et al., 2015) . It can be simplified to the single-key version by using the same key in both the input and output (Dunkelman et al., 2012; Chen and Steinberger, 2014) .
Assuming the underlying permutation be a random one that the adversary can query, both versions, though are proven to be PRP-CPA in the singlekey model (Dunkelman et al., 2012; Even and Mansour, 1997; Chen and Steinberger, 2014) , suffer the related-key attack (Dobraunig et al., 2015) , which makes the Even-Mansour construction fail to be a well-suited blockcipher for many modes of operation, such as OTR (Dobraunig et al., 2015) .
Motivation
How can we provide confidential protection when there is only a cryptographic permutation in hand? The notable Sponge construction designed in SHA-3 (Dworkin, 2015) is a convenient approach. However in contrast to mainstream encryption schemes designed from blockcipher, which in every call, process the message that is as large as the blocksize of the underlying blockcipher, the Sponge construction can't achieve the optimal efficiency, as the message it processes during each call of the underlying primitive is far less than the bandwidth (part of which interacts with the outer while the remaining is reserved to guarantee secure).
Another direct way to get permutation-based encryption schemes that achieve the optimal efficiency is to combine mainstream confidential modes (like CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR, etc) with the Even-Mansour construction. Nevertheless these specific schemes are not secure enough. When using a non-repeated nonce, most of these schemes suffer the blockwise adaptive attack, and then fail to provide confidentiality in lots of practical scenarios like real-time application, online settings, memory-restricted devices, etc. Due to the inability in the Even-Mansour construction to resist related-key attacks, these schemes are prone to suffer related-key attacks (Dobraunig et al., 2015; Karpman, 2015) . In addition, once large permutations are used, the keys used in these schemes are also large (no smaller than the bandwidth of the permutations), which brings a great pressure on the key-management in real world.
Based on the above observations, we study how to design practical encryption schemes from a single cryptographic permutation. We aim at proposing nonce-respected efficient encryption schemes that, when using a key with an appropriate length, can resist both the blockwise adaptive attack and the related-key attack.
By the way, though (online) authenticated encryption schemes can meet these requirements easily, there are lots of applications where unauthenticated encryption is needed. For example, a certain proportion of errors in the recovered plaintext may be acceptable in the digitised voice or video service. Without regard to the integrity, encryption schemes are Encryption Schemes based on a Single Permutation: PCBC, POFB, PCFB and PCTR capable to run sufficiently fast to reduce latency time, which are vital in real-time applications and on-line settings.
Our Contribution
Firstly in Section 3, we analyze 4 specific permutation-based encryption schemes, i.e. SEM-CBC, SEM-OFB, SEM-CFB and SEM-CTR, produced by combining 4 commonly-used encryption modes, i.e. CBC, OFB, CFB and CTR, with the singlekey Even-Mansour cipher (SEM for short). With a random IV, these 4 schemes can provide some confidential protection, but most fail when using a nonrepeated nonce, not to mention the inability to resist the blockwise adaptive attack, which restricts their usage in practical on-line/real-time scenarios. The results are concluded in Table 1 . It's obvious that the direct combination strategy may fail to construct practical permutation-based encryption schemes.
In Section 4 we propose 4 permutation-based encryption schemes -PCBC, POFB, PCFB and PCTR, improved from SEM-CBC, SEM-OFB, SEM-CFB and SEM-CTR respectively. Based on a single ideal permutation, all these 4 schemes can provide confidential protection against the blockwise adaptive chosen plaintext attack in the Φ ⊕ -related-key setting, even when using a non-repeated nonce. We give a detail proof of PCBC, and the other 3 schemes can be proved similarly. We claim that these 4 encryption schemes are very practical, because they are less prone to misuse, apply to practical blockwise adaptive scenarios, and bring less pressure on the keymanagement in real world. Besides, they are more efficient than the Sponge construction since the plaintext block they process during each call of the underlying permutation is as large as the bandwidth.
PRELIMINARIES AND SECURITY MODELS
Notations. By {0, 1} n we denote the set of n binary bits for any n > 0, and {0, 1} n+ = ∞ l=1 {0, 1} nl . Let S be some finite set, s R ← − S denotes selecting an element at uniformly random from S and assign it to s. |S| is the cardinality of S while |s| is the length of s. denotes the string concatenation operation. Perm(n) denotes the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n , and Func(n 1 , n 2 ) denotes the set of all functions mapping {0, 1} n 1 to {0, 1} n 2 .
Encryption Scheme. Let SE : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n+ → {0, 1} n+ be any encryption scheme, where {0, 1} k , {0, 1} n , {0, 1} n+ denote the space of keys, IVs and plaintexts/ciphertexts, respectively.
For any K ∈ {0, 1} k , SE K denotes the encryption function and SE −1 K denotes its inverse, which satisfies that for any IV ∈ {0, 1} n , M ∈ {0,
Here IV denotes either a random one or a nonrepeated nonce. In the former case, i.e. IV R ← − {0, 1} n , IV acts as part of the ciphertext, while in the latter IV is assumed to be controlled by the adversary. In the remaining, we misuse the notation SE K to denote the encryption oracle of SE, which takes in a single input M when using a random IV, but a pair input (N, M) when using a non-repeated nonce. We won't emphasize it unless it causes any confusion.
Besides, we assume that the message which SE processes is already padded as need, i.e. a non-zero multiple of n, since the discussion of padding rules is out of the scope of our paper. Most of encryption schemes provide the CPA confidentiality only, and thus we focus on the CPA setting in this paper.
To define the confidentiality of SE, we use the indistinguishability from random bits in the remaining. Denote $ the function which can produce sufficient random bits on demand. Since SE discussed in our paper is based on permutations, we assume that the underlying ideal permutation is P R ← − Perm(n) and the adversary has access to P ± .
The CPA setting. In the single-key model, we assume that K R ← − {0, 1} k , and the CPA oracle is either SE K or $. Let D be any CPA adversary that makes at most q non-duplicate encryption queries and at most r nonduplicate bi-directional queries to P ± .
Thus the CPA indistinguishability (IND-CPA for short) of SE is defined by the maximum advantage at distinguishing {SE K , P ± } with {$, P ± }, that is, for q, r ≥ 0,
Related-key setting. The indistinguishability definition in the related-key model used in our paper follows the theoretical framework of Bellare and Kohno (Bellare and Kohno, 2003) and Albrecht et al. (Albrecht et al., 2011) . In the related-key setting, the CPA adversary has access to not only the encryption oracle SE K but also SE ϕ(K) where ϕ is a key-derivingfunction chosen from a pre-described set Φ where Φ ⊆ Func(k, k). 
In this paper, we target the Φ ⊕ -related-key security only, where Φ ⊕ = {ϕ ∆ | ∆ ∈ {0, 1} k } and ϕ ∆ denotes the canonical function K → K ⊕ ∆. We will misuse ∆, ϕ ∆ in the remaining unless it is confused.
For any SE, we define a Φ ⊕ -related-key ora-
Similarly, we define a Φ ⊕ -related-key oracle of $ as RK [$] , which denotes the set of |Φ ⊕ | independent functions that produce random bits.
Let D be any Φ ⊕ -related-key CPA adversary that makes at most q non-duplicate queries to the Φ ⊕ -related-key oracle and at most r bi-directional nonduplicate queries to P ± . Thus the Φ ⊕ -related-key CPA indistinguishability (Φ ⊕ -IND-CPA for short) of SE is defined by the maximum advantage at distinguishing {RK[SE] K , P ± } with {RK[$], P ± }, that is, for q, r > 0,
Blockwise adaptive setting. The adversary in the blockwise adaptive setting has the capability to observe the output blocks that are already computed, before deciding subsequent input blocks, and insert any blocks as it likes based on those observations, during a single query. Without loss of generality, let the adversary in the blockwise adaptive chosen plaintext attack (BW-CPA for short) query block-by-block. Take the CPA encryption oracle SE K as an example, we describe briefly how the CPA adversary interacts with its oracle in the blockwise adaptive setting, and other oracles perform similarly.
Let SE be the blockwise adaptive oracle of SE, and during any i th encryption query, after knowing the corresponding ciphertext blocks by que- CPA adversary who makes at most q encryption queries to the blockwise adaptive oracle, and at most r bi-directional queries to the public oracle P ± .
IND-BW-CPA. The BW-CPA indistinguishability (IND-BW-CPA for short) of SE is defined by the maximum advantage at distinguishing SE K , P ± from $, P ± , that is, for q, r > 0, 
THE COMBINATION STRATEGY
In this section, we discuss 4 specific permutationbased encryption schemes -SEM-CBC, SEM-OFB, SEM-CFB and SEM-CTR -produced by combining 4 commonly-used encryption modes, i.e. CBC, OFB, CFB and CTR, with SEM. Due to the chain structure of the modes (except CTR), nearly half of the key-⊕-operations are cancelled and these schemes turn out to be very compact, showed in Fig.1 -Fig.4 .
The analyses of these 4 schemes are deduced from CBC, OFB, CFB and CTR directly (Bellare et al., 1997; Sung et al., 2001; Alkassar et al., 2001; Joux et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; Bard, 2006; Bard, 2007) , as all these 4 schemes are actually the specific cases when the underlying blockcipher is exactly the SEM blockcipher. We omit the details since the analyses are quite trivial, and the results are concluded in Table 1 .
PERMUTATION-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES: PCBC, POFB, PCFB AND PCTR
With a single cryptographic permutation in hand, how can we provide confidential protection? From above, we know that both direct ways -the Sponge construction and the combination strategy-have some deficiencies.
In this section we, inspired by the common blockcipher-based modes of operation i.e. CBC, OFB, CFB and CTR, propose 4 permutation-based encryption schemes -PCBC, POFB, PCFB and PCTR, showed in Fig.5-Fig.8 . Note that in PCBC, the finite multiplication by 2 (see the red dashed in Fig. 5 ) in each block process is essential to resist the blockwise adaptive attack, which is unnecessary in the other 3 schemes (see the red dashed in Fig. 6-8 ) since the original OFB, CFB, and CTR can resist the blockwise adaptive attack, when using a random IV. multiplication, these 4 encryption schemes are practical. Since these 4 schemes, no matter using a random IV no a non-repeated nonce, achieve Φ ⊕ -IND-BW-CPA, which is concluded in Table 1 , they are less prone to misuse, and apply to lots of practical blockwise adaptive scenarios including real-time applications, on-line settings, memory-restricted devices, etc. These schemes bring less pressure on the keymanagement in real world, and the key length can be chosen as need even though large permutations are used. Moreover they are more efficient than the Sponge construction, since the plaintext block processed by one call of the permutation equals exactly the bandwidth of the permutation. In the remaining, we take PCBC as an example to prove that using a non-repeated nonce, PCBC can resist the blockwise adaptive attack in Φ ⊕ -related-key setting, which is described formally in Theorem 1. Similar results can be deduced in POFB, PCFB and PCTR.
Φ ⊕ -IND-BW-CPA of PCBC
Specification of PCBC. Let P R ← − Perm(n) be a n-bit ideal cryptographic permutation, and k is the wanted key length, and PCBC : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n−k × {0, 1} n+ → {0, 1} n+ represents the PCBC scheme.
is defined as following:
for j = 1 to l do T = 2T ;
Theorem 1. To PCBC, assuming that P R ← − Perm(n) and that the Φ ⊕ -related-key BW-CPA adversary makes q Φ ⊕ -related-key queries including at most total σ blocks and at most r queries to P ± ,
Proof. Define the Φ ⊕ -related-key oracle of PCBC as RK [PCBC] :
Without loss of generality, let D be any Φ ⊕ -related-key BW-CPA adversary that makes exactly q non-duplicated related-key queries, denoted as
and l i is the total blocks of
In the blockwise adaptive setting, during any i th related-key query, D can delay choosing M i 
(2) for any j, the computation is processed as T i =
, and C i j is returned. Let $ be the random function defined as before, and RK[$](∆ i , N i , M i j ) always returns a n-bit random string. Besides D also has access to the public permutation P ± . Let D makes exactly r bi-directional queries to P ± , denoted as
Refer to (Chen and Steinberger, 2014) , let D paly the "enhanced" game here, that is D is revealed the key after it has made all its queries but before making its final decision. Moreover in this specific case Encryption Schemes based on a Single Permutation: PCBC, POFB, PCFB and PCTR Denote τ the transcript that D creates to record the queries it made and the answers it received. In more detail, let τ = (τ 0 , τ 1 , τ 2 ), and τ 0 , τ 1 , τ 2 are defined as following:
Obviously, τ 0 mainly denotes the revealed information which in PCBC satisfies that 
where ∆(X,Y ) denotes the statistic distance between X and Y . Next we play the H-Coefficient technique, which is of greatly useful in proving various results on ideal cryptographic primitives such as PRP/PRF (Mennink, 2016; Hoang and Tessaro, 2016; Mouha and Luykx, 2015) , to upper bound ∆(X,Y ). The central idea of the H-Coefficient technique is described as following: Lemma 1. Let T participate into two disjoint subsets T good and T bad , and ∃ε ≥ 0 such that ∀τ ∈ T good ,
When T good with a small ε is large and T bad is small, {∃(e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ S, ∃(e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ S , e 1 = e 1 ∨ e 2 = e 2 }, and
Thus τ is defined as "bad" if any collision event,
That is
In the following, we classify the collisions of T bad that happens in Y into 4 types:
for any i, u, since both K and L i are randomly chosen,
(Actually when i = i the collision probability here in the BW-CPA case is totally different from that in the CPA case. Let j < j , the BW-CPA adversary is capable to choose M i j to maximize Pr[M i j ⊕C i j−1 ⊕ 2 j−1 L i = M i j ⊕C i j −1 ⊕ 2 j −1 L i ] since it knows M i j ,C i j−1 ,C i j −1 , while the CPA adversary isn't capable to. Thus without the finite multiplication by 2 in each block process, the BW-CPA adversary can choose M i j = M i j ⊕C i j−1 ⊕C i j −1 which allows I i j = I i j .)
• Col[τ 1 , τ 0 ]: for any i, j, i , since L i , L i and C i j are randomly chosen,
• Col[τ 1 , τ 2 ]: for any i, j, u, since both L i and C i j are randomly chosen, 
≤ qr 2 k + σ(σ − 1) + qr + 2σ(q + r) 2 n .
By so far, Theorem 1 is proved.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study how to provide confidential protection with a single cryptographic permutation, and propose 4 practical encryption schemes -PCBC, POFB, PCFB and PCTR, by adding two simple kinds of operations -XOR and the finite multiplication. And we prove that, when using a non-repeated nonce, these 4 permutation-based encryption schemes are indistinguishable from the random function against the blockwise adaptive chosen plaintext attack in the Φ ⊕ -related-key setting. Meanwhile they are more efficient than the Sponge construction.
